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ABSTRACT
This article provides evidence of rent sharing from orthogonal directions by exploiting different dimensions
in the same data. Taking advantage of a rich matched employer-employee dataset for France over
the period 1984-2001, we consistently compare industry differences in rent-sharing parameters derived
from three different approaches. The accounting approach and the standard labor economics approach
are compatible with distinct labor bargaining settings (right-to-manage, efficient bargaining, labor
hoarding) whereas the productivity approach hinges on the assumption of efficient bargaining. Across
the different approaches, we evidently find differences in dispersion of the industry-specific rent-sharing
parameter estimates which could be attributable to differences in modeling assumptions and/or data
requirements but these estimates lie within a comparable range. We interpret the latter finding as lending
empirical support to efficient bargaining as the nature of the bargaining process in France over the
considered period.
Sabien Dobbelaere
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
VU University Amsterdam
De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV AMSTERDAM
THE NETHERLANDS
sdobbelaere@feweb.vu.nl
Jacques Mairesse
CREST-INSEE
15, Boulevard Gabriel PERI
92245 MALAKOFF CEDEX
FRANCE
and NBER
mairesse@ensae.fr
1 Introduction
The theoretical underpinnings of individual and rm wage heterogeneity can broadly be classied
into three categories: matching/search-based models (Jovanovic, 1979; Postel-Vinay and Robin,
2002; Mortensen, 2003; Shimer, 2005), incentive compensation models (Lazear and Rosen, 1981)
and rent-sharing models (McDonald and Solow, 1981; Nickell and Andrews, 1983). Regardless
of the theoretical model one favors, the exclusion of unobserved individual or rm wage het-
erogeneity creates biases in wage equations as well as problems in identifying the underlying
sources of wage variation.
On the empirical side, there is a large body of studies examining the e¤ect of industry or
rm performance on wages using either industry or rm data (e.g. Katz and Summers, 1989,
Blanchower et al., 1996, Estevao and Tevlin, 2003 for the US; Christodes and Oswald, 1992,
Abowd and Lemieux, 1993 for Canada; Blanchower et al., 1990, Holmlund and Zetterberg,
1991, Nickell et al., 1994, Hildreth and Oswald, 1997 for European countries) and testing the
rent-sharing hypothesis. The seminal contribution of Abowd et al. (1999), providing a statistical
decomposition of wage rates into worker and rm e¤ects and focusing on the private sector in
France, together with the availability of matched employer-employee datasets, fueled a resurge of
interest in this subject. Recent studies investigating the impact of prots on wages using matched
worker-rm data include Margolis and Salvanes (2001) for France and Norway, Arai (2003) and
Nekby (2003) for Sweden, Kramarz (2003) for France and Martins (2009) for Portugal. Albeit
using di¤erent models of collective bargaining, the results of these studies indicate in general
that changes in protability feed through into long-run changes in wages.1
The contribution of this article to the latter strand of the empirical literature is to provide
evidence of rent sharing from orthogonal directions by exploiting di¤erent dimensions in the
same data. In particular, taking advantage of a rich matched employer-employee dataset for
France, we consistently compare industry di¤erences in rent-sharing parameters derived from
three di¤erent approaches. The rst approach is the accounting approach which is compatible
with distinct labor bargaining settings (right-to-manage, e¢ cient bargaining, labor hoarding)
which di¤er in terms of bargaining scope. In this approach, we directly compute average mea-
sures of rent sharing from the rm accounting information. The second approach is the standard
1The recent studies that use matched employer-employee data to control for unobserved worker abilities nd
smaller but generally signicant e¤ects of performance on wages compared to previous studies based on rm-level
data.
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labor economics approach which is also compatible with the two principal labor bargaining mod-
els, i.e. the right-to-manage model and the e¢ cient bargaining model, and the labor hoarding
model. In this approach, we estimate a wage equation taking into account worker and rm wage
heterogeneity. From the estimated wage-prots elasticities, we retrieve average rent-sharing pa-
rameters. The third approach is the productivity approach which hinges on the assumption of
e¢ cient bargaining. In this approach, we estimate a productivity equation at the rm level. By
comparing the estimated factor elasticities for labor and materials and their shares in revenue,
we are able to derive estimates of average rent-sharing parameters. The three approaches clearly
di¤er in the sources of variation and identication of industry-specic extent of rent sharing.
This article does not aim at testing the various labor bargaining models. The novelty of our
analysis is to compare industry-specic rent-sharing parameters derived from distinct approaches
which di¤er in modeling assumptions and/or data requirements. As expected, we nd that there
exist di¤erences in dispersion of the industry-specic rent-sharing parameter estimates across the
three approaches but the rent-sharing estimates lie within a comparable range across the three
approaches. We interpret the latter result as lending empirical support to e¢ cient bargaining
as the nature of the bargaining process in France over the considered period.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the three approaches. Section 3 discusses the data,
claries the sources of variation and identication of rent sharing within each approach and
focuses on industry di¤erences in rent-sharing parameter estimates within each approach. Sec-
tion 4 consistently compares industry di¤erences in rent-sharing parameter estimates across the
three approaches. Section 5 concludes.
2 Micro-evidence on rent sharing from three di¤erent ap-
proaches
In this section, we present three approaches from which we derive rent-sharing parameter esti-
mates: the accounting approach, the standard labor economics approach and the productivity
approach. The rst two approaches are more general in the sense that they are compatible
with di¤erent labor bargaining settings which di¤er in terms of bargaining scope. The third
approach is the most restrictive one since it imposes a priori a particular bargaining framework,
i.e. e¢ cient bargaining.
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It is not our intention to test empirically which bargaining model is not rejected by the avail-
able data. Instead, we aim at consistently comparing industry-specic rent-sharing parameters
obtained from orthogonal directions in the same data.
2.1 Accounting approach
The workers, represented by the union, and the rm are involved in a bargaining situation.
Both parties maximize their respective utility function during the bargaining process. Union
preferences are represented by a modied Stone-Geary utility function (see e.g. Mezetti and
Dinopoulos, 1991):
U(wit; xit) = (wit   wit)(xit   xit) (1)
where i is a rm index, t a time index, wit is the bargained wage, xit are bargained working
conditions (which will be specied later), and wit  wit and xit  xit are respectively the
reservation wage and the reservation working conditions available in the event of a bargaining
dispute.2 U(:) implies from the point of view of the union that both the wage wit and the
working conditions xit are normal goods.3
Consistent with capital quasi-xity, rm is utility is assumed to equate its short-run prot
at time t: it = Rit   witNit   jitMit, where Rit = PitQit stands for total revenue with Pit
the output price, and Qit = itF (Nit; Mit; Kit) where N is labor, M is material input, K is
capital and F (:) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in its arguments, it is an index
of technical change or truetotal factor productivity and jit is the material input price.
Following the literature, we assume that the conventional asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
is the appropriate solution concept. The bounds of the bargaining range are given by the
minimum acceptable utility levels for both parties. In the absence of an agreement, the union
receives the reservation wage wit, in which case union utility equals zero. If no revenue accrues
to the rm when bargaining breaks down, the rms utility equals zero in which case the rm
2Mezetti and Dinopoulos (1991) consider a more general modied Stone-Geary utility function: U(wit; Nit) =
(wit   wit)(xit   xit) , where xit = Nit is the employment level, xit = 0,   0 and   0. The union is wage
(employment) oriented i¤  >  ( < ). We follow McDonald and Solow (1981) by setting  =  = 1, meaning
that the union is equally concerned with the wage premium (wit   wit) and the working conditions premium
(xit   xit).
3The marginal rate of substitution between x and w,
@U
@x
@U
@w
=
(w w)
(x x) is increasing in w, keeping x constant,
which is a su¢ cient condition for normality of x. A similar argument holds for w (Mezetti and Dinopoulos,
1991).
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has to bear only the xed costs of capital. Hence, the generalized Nash product is written as:
G = f(wit   wit)(xit   xit)git fRit witNit jitMitg1 it
where it 2 [0; 1] represents the workersbargaining power.
Maximization of G with respect to the wage rate gives the following rst-order condition:
wit = wit + it

Rit   witNit   jitMit
Nit

(2)
where it =
it
1 it . Eq. (2) states that the equilibrium wage is determined by the reservation
wage, the relative bargaining strength of the workers and the rm and the level of prots per
employee.
The extent of rent sharing that follows from Eq. (2) is compatible with distinct labor bargaining
settings that di¤er in terms of bargaining scope: the right-to-manage model (Nickell and An-
drews, 1983), the e¢ cient bargaining model (McDonald and Solow, 1981) and the labor hoarding
model (Haskel and Martin, 1992).
The right-to-manage (RTM) model postulates that the union bargains with the rm over wages
while the rm chooses its prot-maximizing employment level. In the standard representation,
the union prefers higher wages and more employment. Setting xit = Nit and xit = 0 in Eq. (1),
we obtain the most common utility function in the literature, i.e. the rent maximization utility
function of wages and employment (Rosen, 1969; Calvo, 1978; Johnson, 1990):
U(wit; xit) = (wit   wit)Nit (3)
The outcome of the bargaining is the asymmetric Generalized Nash solution to:
max
wit
f(wit   wit)Nitgit fRit witNit jitMitg1 it , from which Eq. (2) follows.
Under the RTM bargaining setting, the union and the rm however agree on a Pareto-ine¢ cient
contract. To obtain Pareto e¢ ciency, the e¢ cient bargaining (EB) model represents collective
bargaining by simultaneous negotiation over wages and employment. Assuming again that the
union maximizes its membership aggregate gain from employment, the outcome of the bargaining
is the asymmetric Generalized Nash solution to:
max
wit;Nit
f(wit   wit)Nitgit fRit witNit jitMitg1 it (4)
Maximization with respect to the wage rate gives Eq. (2).
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Maximization with respect to employment gives the following rst-order condition:
wit = (RN )it + it

Rit  (RN )itN it jitMit
Nit

(5)
with (RN )it the marginal revenue of labor.
If workers value on-the-job leisure, overhead labor will constitute a bargaining issue for the
union in addition to labor reward. Setting xit =

NO
NP

it
and xit =

NO
NP

it
where (NO)it
is the proportion of the workforce that is paid for but unproductive due to e.g. illicit shirk-
ing, set-up time of machinery, co¤ee breaks, (NP )it is productive labor,

NO
NP

it
is the degree of
overmanning or generous crew sizes and

NO
NP

it
is the reservation overhead labor ratio, the pref-
erences of the union can be represented as follows according to the labor hoarding (LH) model :
U(wit; (NO)it) = (wit wit)

NO
NP

it
 

NO
NP

it

. We assume that both types of labor are paid
the same and that productive labor is unilaterally chosen by the rm at the prot-maximizing
level, i.e. (RNP )it = wit with (RNP )it the marginal revenue of productive labor. Under the LH
bargaining setting, the outcome of the bargaining is the asymmetric Generalized Nash solution
to: max
wit;(NO)it

(wit   wit)

NO
NP

it
 

NO
NP

it
it
fRit witNit jitMitg1 it . Maximization
with respect to the wage rate still gives Eq. (2) with Nit = (NO)it + (NP )it. Maximiza-
tion with respect to unproductive (overhead) labor gives the following rst-order condition:
wit = it

Rit witNit jitMit
(NP )it

NO
NP

it
 

NO
NP

it

.
By simply rewriting Eq. (2) and dening the wage premium as the di¤erence between the bar-
gained wage and the reservation wage in the event of a bargaining dispute ((WP )it = wit   wit),
we directly compute the extent of rent sharing
 
ait

that is compatible with the distinct bar-
gaining settings discussed above from the rm accounting information:
ait =
(wit   wit)Nit
PitQit   witNit   jitMit (6)
ait =
ait
1 + ait
=
(wit   wit)Nit
PitQit   witNit   jitMit (7)
2.2 Standard labor economics approach
Following standard practice in the rent-sharing literature (for references, we refer to Section
1), we interpret wit as the expected income in the event of a bargaining dispute which is
determined by productivity-related characteristics of the worker and the probability of becoming
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unemployed. Having longitudinal data, we assume that wit is captured by year e¤ects (t) and
by a proxy of the wage outside the employing rm within the same industry (wIt). Hence, the
empirical specication of Eq. (2) can be written as:
lnwj(i)t = lnwIt + "
w

N
ln

it
Nit

+ j(i) + i + t + jt (8)
where wj(i)t is the wage of individual j working in rm i at date t, it and Nit are respectively
the prots and employment of the employing rm i at time t, "w
N
is the wage-prots elasticity,
j(i) is the individual e¤ect, i the rm e¤ect, t the year e¤ect and jt the statistical residual.
From the discussion in Section 2.1, it is clear that Eq. (2) is independent of the true nature of
the employment function. Since Eq. (8) is simply the statistical specication of this equilibrium
relation, the rent-sharing parameter estimate that is derived from the estimated wage-prots
elasticity is evidently compatible with an RTM, EB or LH bargaining setting.
2.3 Productivity approach
In this approach, we impose a priori a particular bargaining setting. More specically, the
rent-sharing estimates derived from this approach result from embedding the EB model into a
microeconomic version of Halls (1988) framework (see also Crépon et al., 1999, 2005; Dobbe-
laere, 2004; Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2008; Boulhol et al., 2010).
Denoting the logarithm of Qit; Nit; Mit; Kit and it by qit; nit; mit; kit and it respectively,
the logarithmic specication of the production function gives:
qit = ("
Q
N )itnit + ("
Q
M )itmit + ("
Q
K)itkit + it (9)
where ("QJ )it (J = N; M; K) is the elasticity of output with respect to input factor J .
Each rm operates under imperfect competition in the product market.
On the labor side, we assume that the union and the rm are involved in an EB procedure.
Consistent with the specication of the union utility function and the rm utility function in
the accounting approach, it is the unions objective to maximize its membership aggregate gain
from employment and it is the rms objective to maximize its short-run prot. Material input
is unilaterally determined by the rm from prot maximization: (RM )it = jit with (RM )it the
marginal revenue of material input, which directly leads to:
("QM )it = it (M )it (10)
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it =
Pit
(CQ)it
refers to the mark-up of output price Pit over marginal cost (CQ)it and (M )it =
jitMit
PitQit
is the share of material costs in total revenue.
Solving simultaneously the two rst-order conditions with respect to wages and employment,
Eqs. (2) and (5) respectively, leads to an expression for the contract curve: (RN )it = wit. Un-
der risk neutrality, the rms decision about employment equals the one of a (non-bargaining)
neoclassical rm that maximizes its short-run prot at the reservation wage. Denoting the mar-
ginal revenue by (RQ)it and the marginal product of labor by (QN )it, we express the marginal
revenue of labor as (RN )it = (RQ)it (QN )it =
Pit(QN )it
it
. If we use this expression together with
Eq. (5), the elasticity of output with respect to labor can be written as:
("QN )it = it (N )it   itit [1  (N )it   (M )it] (11)
with (N )it = witNitPitQit . Note that Eq. (11) discriminates between the RTM bargaining setting
and the EB bargaining setting. In the RTM model, employment is highly endogenous with
respect to wages. As in the perfectly competitive labor market case, the marginal revenue of
labor is equal to the wage whereas in the EB model, employment does not directly depend on
the bargained wage. Hence, the null hypothesis of it = 0 in Eq. (11) does not only correspond
to the assumption that the labor market is competitive but also to the less restrictive RTM
assumption.
Assuming constant returns to scale
h
("QN )it + ("
Q
M )it + ("
Q
K)it = 1
i
, the capital elasticity can be
expressed as: ("QK)it = 1  it(M )it   it(N )it + itit [1  (N )it   (M )it].4
Estimating the production function:
qit   kit = ("QN )it [nit   kit] + ("QM )it [mit   kit] + it (12)
allows the identication of (i) the extent of rent sharing it and (ii) the price-cost mark-up it:
it =
it
1  it
=
("QN )it  
h
("QM )it
(N )it
(M )it
i
("QM )it
(M )it
[(N )it + (M )it   1]
(13)
4The returns to scale assumption evidently a¤ects the estimated output elasticities of factor inputs. In general,
the production function coe¢ cients are estimated to be lower when allowing for non constant returns to scale.
However, since the rst-order conditions with respect to the variable input factors Eq. (11) for labor and Eq. (10)
for materialsdo not depend on the returns to scale assumption, our rent-sharing parameter estimate is robust
to this assumption.
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it =
it
1 + it
(14)
it =
("QM )it
(M )it
(15)
3 Data description and a rst look at the three approaches
3.1 Data description
We use data from the DADS (Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales) on the matched
worker-rm side and rm accounting information from EAE (Enquête Annuelle dEntreprise,
Service des Etudes et Statistiques Industrielles (SESSI)) on the rm side. The DADS is a
large-scale administrative database collected by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et
des Etudes Economiques) and maintained in the Division des Revenus. The data are based on
a mandatory employer report of the gross earnings of each employee subject to French payroll
taxes. These taxes apply to essentially all employed individuals in the economy. The Division
des Revenus provides an extract of the DADS for scientic purposes, covering all individuals
employed in French enterprises who were born in October of even-numbered years, excluding
civil servants.
Our analysis sample is obtained by merging the rm current account and balance sheet data of
the 10 646 rms that we used in our previous research (Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2008) with the
matched employer-employee information. Our initial dataset contained 1 388 089 observations,
each corresponding to a unique rm-worker-year combination. Because of the 1982 and 1990
Census, however, we excluded the years 1981, 1983 and 1990 from the DADS database. To avoid
large discrepancies in the number of years available in the matched employer-employee dataset
and the rm dataset, we select the period 1984-2001. After some cleaning to eliminate outliers
and anomalies, our matched worker-rm dataset contains 1 077 402 observations, corresponding
to 209 780 individuals and 10 396 rms. For each observation, we have information on the exact
starting date and end date of the job spell in the rm and the full-time/part-time status of the
worker. Each rm-worker-year observation additionally includes information on the individuals
sex, month, year and place of birth, current occupation and total net nominal earnings during
the year. Employer characteristics include the location and industry of the employing rm.
9.7% of the employees move at least once between rms (called movers).
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For regression purposes, we only select full-time stayers who worked 12 months a year. Our nal
sample contains 719 693 observations, corresponding to 91 353 individuals, 9 121 rms and 38
industries. Looking at the distribution of workers across rms, we observe 2 workers per rm
for rms in the rst quartile, 3 workers per rm for rms in the second quartile and 7 workers
per rm for rms in the third quartile. The number of observations per worker (rm) is 7 (13)
for the rst quartile of workers (rms), 11 (16) for the second quartile and 14 (16) for the third
quartile.
Using the rm dataset, we measure output (Qit) by real current production deated by the
two-digit producer price index of the French industrial classication. Labor (Nit) refers to the
average number of employees in each rm for each year and material input (Mit) refers to
intermediate consumption deated by the two-digit intermediate consumption price index. The
capital stock (Kit) is measured by the gross bookvalue of xed assets.5 The shares of labor
(N )it and material input (M )it are constructed by dividing respectively the rm total labor
cost and undeated intermediate consumption by the rm undeated production and by taking
the average of these ratios over adjacent years. Prots per worker

it
Nit

is measured as value
added minus labor costs divided by the average number of employees in each rm for each year.
Using the matched worker-rm dataset, the wage
 
wj(i)t

refers to the average net nominal wage
per worker. In addition to dening the wage at the worker level, we retrieve the rm average
wage per worker in two ways: (i) computed directly from the rm accounting information as
the wage bill divided by the average number of employees in each rm for each year (wit) and
(ii) using the worker information and computed as the sum of the wages of the workers divided
by the number of workers observed in each rm-year
 P
j2i
wj(i)tP
j
j2i
!
. By construction, the latter is
highly correlated with the average net nominal wage per worker
 
wj(i)t

.
Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation and quartile values of our main variables. The
average growth rate of real rm output for the overall sample is 2.6% per year over the period
1984-2001. Capital has remained stable, while labor and materials have increased at an average
5The capital stock measure is the gross book value of tangible assets as reported in the rm balance sheets at
the beginning of the year (or the end of the previous year), adjusted for ination. This is a standard measure in
microeconometric studies of the production function based on rm accounting information. It has the advantage
of relying on direct information provided by the rm and does not make the strong assumptions underlying the
capital stock measures obtained by the perpetual inventory method, mainly a constant rate of depreciation or
a xed service life. In practice, however, panel data estimates of capital elasticities appear to be very robust to
the use of the two types of measures. See for example Atkinson and Mairesse (1978) and Mairesse and Pescheux
(1980).
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annual growth rate of 0.7% and 4% respectively. As expected for rm-level data, the dispersion
of all these variables is considerably large. For example, capital growth is smaller than -7.2%
for the rst quartile of rms and higher than 6.5% for the fourth quartile.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
3.2 A rst exploration of the industry-specic rent-sharing parame-
ters derived from the three approaches
In this section, we explain how the three approaches di¤er in the sources of variation and iden-
tication of the extent of rent sharing. Within each approach, we concentrate on industry
di¤erences in the extent of rent sharing. We decompose the total sample into 38 manufactur-
ing industries according to the French industrial classication (Nomenclature économique de
synthèse - Niveau 3[NES 114]). Table A.1 in Appendix shows the industry repartition of the
sample and presents the number of rms, the number of workers, the number of observations
in the rm dataset and the number of observations in the matched worker-rm dataset for each
industry I 2 f1; :::; 38g.
3.2.1 Accounting approach
For each industry I 2 f1; :::; 38g, we compute the extent of rent sharing based on Eq. (7) where
we measure the reservation wage wit by the 5th percentile value of the nominal wage per worker
in the industry in which the rm operates. From Eq. (7), it is clear that variations in the wedge
between the wage premium of all employees and the rms short-run prot evaluated at the
reservation wage identify the extent of rent sharing. Table 2 presents for each industry I the
distribution of the rm-specic extent of rent sharing
 
ait

, which gives an indication about
within-industry di¤erences in .
Previous studies (Dobbelaere, 2004; Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2008; Boulhol et al., 2010) pro-
vide evidence of a positive correlation between the rm-specic extent of rent sharing and
the rm-specic price-cost mark-up. This is an empirical inference based on data analysis.
From theory, we know that the price-cost margin, i.e. the share of the rents kept by the
rm, is positively related to the price-cost mark-up. In addition to ait , Table 2 therefore
presents also the distribution of the rm-specic price-cost mark-up assuming that rms con-
sider input prices as given prior to deciding their level of inputs ( onlyait) and the price-cost
mark-up taking into account that workers are able to extract part of the product rents
 
ait

.
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From the rm accounting information, we compute  onlyait as 1 +

PitQit witNit jitMit
PitQit

and
ait as 1+

PitQit witNit  jitMit
PitQit

=  onlyait +
(wit wit)Nit
PitQit
. As an alternative to Eqs. (6) and
(7), we hence can compute ait as
ait  onlyait
 onlyait 1 and ait as
ait  onlyait
ait 1
.
Table 2 is drawn up in increasing order of the median value of ait . Focusing on the median
distribution across industries, the extent of rent sharing
 
ait

is lower than 0.12 for the rst
quartile of industries and exceeds 0.31 for the upper quartile. The corresponding price-cost
mark-up
 
ait

is computed to be lower than 1.22 for the rst quartile of industries and higher
than 1.35 for the top quartile.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
3.2.2 Standard labor economics approach
Estimating Eq. (8) for each industry I 2 f1; :::; 38g gives us industry-specic wage-prots elas-
ticity estimates. To retrieve industry-specic rent-sharing parameter estimates, the industry-
specic elasticity estimates are multiplied by the industry-specic ratio of the rm average wage
per worker to the prot per worker. Within this approach, the identication of industry-specic
rent sharing is hence driven by di¤erences between the estimated industry-specic elasticity and
the industry-specic ratio of total prots to the wage bill.
Table 3 presents the industry-specic wage-prots elasticities and the implied extent of rent
sharing. Consistent with the accounting approach, we proxy the reservation wage by the 5th
percentile value of the nominal wage per worker in the industry in which the rm operates.6
Observing considerable variation in the prot per worker variable

it
Nit

over time, we use the
average of the prot per worker variable from time t until (t   4) as the main independent
variable.7 The left part of Table 3 presents the results of using the natural logarithm of the
average net nominal wage per worker (wj(i)t) as the dependent variable, the middle part reports
the results of using the natural logarithm of the rm average wage per worker (wit) and the
right part displays the results of using the natural logarithm of the rm average wage per
worker computed on the basis of the worker information
 P
j2i
wj(i)tP
j
j2i
!
. To take into account
6As a robustness check, we experimented with the 1st percentile value of the nominal wage per worker in the
industry in which the rm operates as a proxy for the reservation wage, using either the matched worker-rm
dataset or the rm dataset. None of the alternative measures a¤ected our wage-prots elasticity estimates.
7Since the rm dataset covers the period 1978-2001, we also use information over the period 1978-1984 to
compute the smooth prot per worker variable.
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endogeneity problems, we adopt the system GMM estimator and use appropriate lags of internal
variables (q; n;m and k) in levels (rst-di¤erences) as instruments in the rst-di¤erenced (levels)
equations.8 The motivation of estimating the wage equation in logs is essentially that bargaining
does not apply to negative prots. By taking the natural logarithm of our smooth prot per
worker variable, we lose only 0.3% of the observations in the sample.
Within each part, the rst column reports the estimated industry-specic wage-prots elasticityb"w
N

I
, the second column derives the corresponding industry-specic relative extent of rent
sharing (b
I
) by multiplying the estimated industry-specic wage-prots elasticity by the median
value of the ratio of the rm average wage per worker to the prot per worker at the industry
level and the third column displays the corresponding industry-specic extent of rent sharingb
I

.9 The table is drawn up in increasing order of bI using ln  wj(i)t as the dependent
variable.
Focusing on the left part of the table, the wage-prots elasticity appears to be positive and
signicant at the 10% level for all but 3 industries. This elasticity is estimated to be lower
than 0.07 for the rst quartile of industries and higher than 0.15 for the upper quartile. How
do these elasticity estimates match up with other studies? Drawing upon various kinds of
data, the estimated elasticities between wages and prots per worker range between 0.04 and
0.2. Using data on Anglo-Saxon countries, Carruth and Oswald (1987), Denny and Machin
(1991), Christodes and Oswald (1992), Blanchower et al. (1996) and Hildreth and Oswald
(1997) nd a central elasticity estimate of 0.04. These low estimates could be the result of not
(adequately) controlling for the endogeneity of rents. Conrming this presumption, Abowd and
Lemieux (1993) for Canada, Estevao and Tevlin (1995) for the US and Van Reenen (1996) for the
UK report an elasticity estimate between 0.15 and 0.30. These studies use respectively industry
import and export prices, industry demand shifters retrieved from input-output tables and rm-
8The GMM estimation is carried out in Stata 10.1 (Roodman, 2005). We report results for the one -step
estimator, for which inference based on the asymptotic variance matrix is shown to be more reliable than for
the asymptotically more e¢ cient two-step estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). When using ln
 
wj(i)t

as the
dependent variable, the Sargan test of overidentication is not rejected for 18 industries and the autocorrelation
tests are not rejected for 33 industries. When using ln (wit) or ln
 P
j2i
wj(i)tP
j
j2i
!
as the dependent variable, the
Sargan test of overidentication is not rejected for all industries. The autocorrelation tests are not rejected for
31 (36) industries when using ln (wit)
 
ln
 P
j2i
wj(i)tP
j
j2i
!!
as the dependent variable. Results not reported but
available upon request.
9Consistent with the smooth prot per worker variable, we compute the average of the ratio of the rm
average wage per worker to the prot per worker from time t until (t  4).
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and industry-specic technological innovations as instruments for (quasi-) rents. Studies for
continental and Nordic Europe point to lower estimates. Margolis and Salvanes (2001) and Arai
(2003) nd an elasticity estimate in the [0:01-0:03]-range for Norway and Sweden respectively.
Using a cross-section of French manufacturing workers, Fakhfakh and FitzRoy (2004) point to
an elasticity of 0.02 for France. Rycx and Tojerow (2004) and Brock and Dobbelaere (2006)
report an elasticity estimate of 0.06 and 0.03 for Belgium respectively. The third column of the
left part indicates that the corresponding extent of rent sharing
b
I

is lower than 0.10 for the
rst quartile of industries and exceeds 0.21 for the top quartile.
Focusing on the middle (right) part, ("w)I is estimated to be positive and signicant at the
10% level for 24 (22) out of the 38 industries. The distribution of
b"w
N

I
and
b
I

across
industries using ln(wit) or ln
 P
j2i
wj(i)tP
j
j2i
!
as the dependent variable closely corresponds to the
corresponding distributions discussed above.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
3.2.3 Productivity approach
Since our study aims at assessing industry di¤erences in the extent of rent sharing derived
from the three approaches, we estimate the average rent-sharing parameter for each industry
I 2 f1; :::; 38g. Hence, the corresponding statistical specication of Eq. (12) is: qit   kit =
"QN (nit kit)+"QM (mit kit)+it, with it the disturbance term. Consistent with the accounting
approach, we also present (i) the average industry-specic price-cost mark-up assuming that
input prices are known before input choices are made and (ii) the average industry-specic price-
cost mark-up taking into account that wages and employment are the subject of a bargaining
agreement.
The data features that are key to empirical identication of the extent of rent sharing and the
price-cost mark-up are the di¤erences between the estimated output elasticities of labor and
materials and their revenues shares. There are many sources of variation in input shares. Some
of them are related to variation in hours of work, machinery, capacity utilization (variation in
the business cycle). When deriving our parameters of interest, we want to abstract from such
sources of variation. Therefore, we assume average input shares. Hence, we derive average
industry-specic rent-sharing parameters by comparing the estimated average industry-specic
production function coe¢ cients, i.e. the estimated average industry-specic output elasticities of
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labor and materials, with the average industry-specic shares of labor and materials in revenue:bI = (b"QN )I h(b"QM )I (N )I(M )I i(b"Q
M
)I
(M )I
[(N )I+(M )I 1]
, bI = bI1+bI and bI = (b"QM )I(M )I .10 The standard errors of bI ; bI and bI
are computed using the Delta Method (Woolridge, 2002).11
Table 4 summarizes the system GMM results of the industry analysis using the same instruments
as in Section 3.2.2.12 The table is drawn up in increasing order of bI . The estimated average
extent of rent sharing
bI belongs to the [0; 1]-interval for 25 industries, 16 out of these 25
estimates are signicant at the 10% level. The average price-cost mark-up (bI) is estimated to
be signicantly higher than 1 for 31 industries.
Industry di¤erences in the parameter estimates appear to be sizeable. Considering all industries,
there is no evidence of rent sharing for the bottom quartile of industries but we estimate it to
be higher than 0.33 for the top quartile. Focusing on median values, the average extent of
rent sharing and the average price-cost mark-up are estimated at 0.20 and 1.25 respectively.
Ignoring the occurrence of rent sharing reduces the estimated median price-cost mark-up to
1.21. How do these industry di¤erences compare with other studies using the same approach
and similar estimation techniques for di¤erent countries? Using a panel of 7 086 Belgian rms in
18 manufacturing industries over the period 1988-1995, Dobbelaere (2004) nds that the extent
of rent sharing is lower than 0.16 for the rst quartile of industries and higher than 0.26 for the
third quartile. The median value is estimated at 0.21. Using a panel of 11 799 British rms
in 20 manufacturing industries, Boulhol et al. (2010) estimate the extent of rent sharing to be
lower than 0.19 for the bottom quartile of industries and higher than 0.54 for the top quartile.
The median value is estimated at 0.40.
Considering the industries for which the extent of rent sharing lies in the [0; 1]-interval and the
price-cost mark-up exceeds 1 [24 industries], the rent-sharing parameter
bI is estimated to
be lower than 0.19 for the rst quartile of industries and higher than 0.38 for the upper quartile.
10When interpreting the (di¤erences in the) extent of rent sharing, we should be mindful of other forces that are
not included in our modeling frameworkimpacting the estimated elasticity-revenue share ratios. Possibilities
range from economic factors like distortions in the intermediate materials market, other types of imperfect
competition in the labor market (e.g. monopsony), variable factor utilization and factor adjustment costs to
measurement issues.
11Dropping subscripts,
 
b2 =  MN+M 12
b"Q
M
2 
b"Q
N
!2
 2b"Q
N
b"Q
M
 
b"Q
N
;b"Q
M
!
+
b"Q
N
2 
b"Q
M
!2
b"Q
M
4 ,
b
2
=
(b)2
(1+b)4 and  b2 = 1(M )2

b"Q
M
2
.
12Results for the one -step estimator are reported. The Sargan test of overidentication is not rejected for 35
industries and the autocorrelation tests are not rejected for 25 industries (results available upon request).
15
The corresponding estimate of the price-cost mark-up (bI) is found to be lower than 1.25 for
the rst quartile of industries and higher than 1.36 for the top quartile.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
4 A comparison of the distribution of I across the three
di¤erent approaches
A priori, sizeable rent-sharing di¤erences across the three approaches could be expected due
to two main reasons. First, di¤erences in modeling assumptions about the underlying labor
bargaining setting and the nature of competition in the product market could drive these dif-
ferences (see Section 2). The accounting approach and the standard labor economics approach
are compatible with distinct labor bargaining settings while the productivity approach assumes
that bargaining issues involve wages and employment and explicitly models imperfect compe-
tition in the product market. Second, di¤erences in the underlying sources of identication of
rent sharing and hence data requirements could explain these di¤erences (see Section 3). The
accounting approach is less data-demanding and provides a direct way of deriving rent-sharing
parameters. The standard labor economics approach takes into account both worker and rm
wage heterogeneity. Previous studies (for references we refer to Section 1) have shown that the
inclusion of worker wage heterogeneity downwardly a¤ects the response of wages to performance.
The productivity approach indirectly derives the extent of rent sharing through the elasticities of
output with respect to variable input factors (labor and materials). This section highlights po-
tential rent-sharing di¤erences across the three approaches by consistently comparing industry
di¤erences in rent-sharing parameters derived from the three approaches.
Table 5 presents the distribution of the extent of rent sharing
bI across the three approaches.
We focus on the median values of the accounting extent of rent sharing. When using the standard
labor economics approach, we compute the relative extent of rent-sharing parameters (bI) by
multiplying the estimated wage-prots elasticities by the median value of the smooth ratio of
the rm average wage per worker to the prot per worker at the industry level, from which
we compute the extent of rent sharing
bI. The upper part of Table 5 displays the system
GMM results, the lower part reports the levels OLS results. For both estimators, we consider
(i) all industries and (ii) a subsample of industries for which the relative extent of rent-sharing
parameters are estimated (or computed) to be positive across the di¤erent approaches. This
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subsample contains 20 industries when focusing on either the GMM results or the OLS results.
Both estimators have 15 industries in common.
Focusing on the upper part of Table 5 and considering all industries, we observe the most size-
able dispersion of the estimated extent of rent-sharing parameter
bI within the productivity
approach with an interquartile range of 0.40. The smallest dispersion is observed within the
standard labor economics approach using ln(wit) as the dependent variable in the wage equation
with an interquartile range of 0.07. The median value of I across the three di¤erent approaches
varies between 0.10 and 0.22.
Restricting the sample to the economically meaningful parameter estimates [20 industries] re-
veals that the di¤erences in dispersion across the di¤erent approaches become smaller. The
interquartile range across the three approaches varies between 0.08 (standard labor economics
approach using ln
 P
j2i
wj(i)tP
j
j2i
!
as the dependent variable in the wage equation) and 0.18 (produc-
tivity approach). The remaining di¤erences in dispersion could be due to di¤erences in modeling
assumptions and/or data requirements.
Considering all industries and looking at the median values, we nd that the levels OLS estimates
are lower compared to the system GMM estimates for the standard labor economics approach
(using ln
 P
j2i
wj(i)tP
j
j2i
!
as the dependent variable in the wage equation) and the productivity
approach. The dispersion of bI within each approach appears to be smaller when endogeneity
problems are not taken into account. The productivity approach displays the largest dispersion
(value of 0.31) whereas the smallest interquartile range (value of 0.05) is observed within the
standard labor economics approach using ln(wit) as the dependent variable in the wage equation.
To graphically illustrate the rent-sharing di¤erences across the three approaches, Figure 1
presents the box diagrams for the subsample of the economically meaningful rent-sharing es-
timates. The upper diagram displays the system GMM estimates whereas the lower diagram
shows the levels OLS estimates. Keep however in mind that these box diagrams are based on
di¤erent subsamples, having 15 out of the 20 industries in common.
The discussion above conrms our presumption that there exist rent-sharing di¤erences across
the three approaches. However, if we compare the quartile values across the three approaches,
we can conclude that the rent-sharing parameter estimates lie within a comparable range. Tak-
ing into account endogeneity problems and considering the economically meaningful parameter
estimates, the lower quartile values range between 0.07 and 0.17, the median values between
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0.12 and 0.26 and the upper quartile values between 0.16 and 0.36. When endogeneity problems
are not taking into account, the corresponding ranges are [0:10-0:19] for the rst quartile values,
[0:13-0:22] for the median values and [0:15-0:26] for the third quartile values. Given that the
accounting approach and the standard labor economics approach are compatible with distinct
labor bargaining settings while the productivity approach hinges on the assumption of e¢ cient
bargaining, we interpret the nding that the rent-sharing parameter estimates lie within a com-
parable range as supporting evidence of e¢ cient bargaining as the labor bargaining setting in
France over the considered period.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
5 Conclusion
This article provides evidence of rent sharing from orthogonal directions by exploiting di¤er-
ent dimensions in the same data. By doing so, we contribute to the empirical rent-sharing
literature. Taking advantage of a rich matched employer-employee dataset for France covering
the period 1984-2001, we compare industry-specic rent-sharing parameters derived from three
di¤erent approaches: the accounting approach, the standard labor economics approach and the
productivity approach. The rst two approaches are compatible with distinct labor bargaining
settings (right-to-manage, e¢ cient bargaining, labor hoarding) while the latter hinges on the
assumption of e¢ cient bargaining. As expected, our results point to di¤erences in dispersion of
the industry-specic rent-sharing parameter estimates across the three approaches which could
be attributable to di¤erences in modeling assumptions and/or data requirements. Focusing
on the economically meaningful rent-sharing estimates, we nd that the estimates lie within a
comparable range across the three approaches. We interpret the latter result as lending empir-
ical support to e¢ cient bargaining as the nature of the bargaining process in France over the
considered period.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Variables 1984-2001
Mean Sd. Q1 Q2 Q3 N
Real rm output growth rate qit 0.026 0.152 -0.055 0.024 0.108 125528
Labor growth rate nit 0.007 0.123 -0.042 0.000 0.055 125528
Capital growth rate kit 0.001 0.152 -0.072 -0.017 0.065 125528
Materials growth rate mit 0.041 0.193 -0.060 0.038 0.141 125528
Labor share in nominal output (N )it 0.310 0.135 0.214 0.295 0.389 132552
Materials share in nominal output (M )it 0.517 0.155 0.420 0.524 0.624 132552
qit  kit 0.026 0.189 -0.077 0.027 0.129 125528
nit  kit 0.006 0.165 -0.075 0.012 0.087 125528
mit  kit 0.040 0.221 -0.081 0.039 0.159 125528
Prot per worker itNit 21592 30658 6761 13529 25839 132552
Firm average wage per worker wit 28346 8453 22480 27220 32817 132552
Number of workers per rm
P
j
j2i
10 55 2 3 7 9121
Average wage per worker wj(i)t 17199 9237 11650 14794 19553 719693
23
Table 2
Accounting approach: Industry analysis:
Distribution of the rm-specic extent of rent sharing ait and price-cost mark-up ait (only)
within each industry I 2 f1; : : : ; 38g
ait ait  onlyait ait
Industry I Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
23 -1.045 -0.269 0.438 -0.326 0.310 1.057 1.040 1.175 1.297 0.949 1.080 1.264
4 0.056 0.094 0.180 0.059 0.091 0.154 1.101 1.158 1.235 1.179 1.216 1.271
3 0.055 0.114 0.266 0.057 0.114 0.214 1.133 1.215 1.296 1.220 1.296 1.399
2 0.051 0.132 0.227 0.048 0.117 0.185 1.077 1.131 1.188 1.163 1.202 1.250
1 0.076 0.150 0.283 0.073 0.132 0.223 1.069 1.121 1.198 1.172 1.219 1.307
14 0.092 0.165 0.292 0.086 0.143 0.244 1.076 1.136 1.223 1.241 1.302 1.344
24 0.099 0.172 0.297 0.090 0.147 0.229 1.160 1.224 1.299 1.312 1.371 1.431
30 0.103 0.178 0.281 0.101 0.153 0.222 1.142 1.196 1.256 1.277 1.339 1.378
26 0.111 0.183 0.309 0.104 0.157 0.238 1.123 1.206 1.290 1.283 1.348 1.412
15 0.071 0.188 0.310 0.066 0.158 0.237 1.110 1.177 1.252 1.258 1.329 1.397
34 0.126 0.191 0.336 0.113 0.162 0.255 1.109 1.169 1.233 1.234 1.272 1.336
7 0.103 0.208 0.362 0.094 0.173 0.275 1.092 1.152 1.236 1.283 1.339 1.383
6 0.100 0.223 0.405 0.098 0.185 0.305 1.075 1.134 1.207 1.265 1.330 1.390
29 0.115 0.226 0.361 0.105 0.185 0.266 1.132 1.180 1.233 1.259 1.304 1.365
10 0.111 0.226 0.441 0.100 0.184 0.306 1.112 1.176 1.252 1.288 1.330 1.391
35 0.123 0.239 0.410 0.110 0.196 0.297 1.100 1.152 1.206 1.226 1.270 1.328
25 0.144 0.241 0.439 0.126 0.206 0.306 1.094 1.170 1.269 1.277 1.353 1.400
27 0.114 0.269 0.445 0.103 0.212 0.308 1.070 1.126 1.196 1.207 1.260 1.320
9 0.133 0.269 0.382 0.126 0.220 0.286 1.127 1.200 1.277 1.282 1.323 1.369
37 0.142 0.269 0.444 0.129 0.219 0.311 1.134 1.195 1.270 1.269 1.332 1.397
32 0.115 0.269 0.471 0.104 0.218 0.321 1.115 1.175 1.264 1.190 1.244 1.313
5 0.130 0.272 0.495 0.116 0.215 0.333 1.098 1.156 1.231 1.219 1.279 1.360
8 0.152 0.278 0.443 0.132 0.218 0.308 1.084 1.157 1.242 1.318 1.373 1.434
13 0.126 0.279 0.513 0.119 0.224 0.360 1.098 1.161 1.257 1.218 1.290 1.382
31 0.159 0.290 0.516 0.150 0.241 0.356 1.110 1.166 1.243 1.163 1.216 1.305
11 0.138 0.313 0.612 0.139 0.251 0.388 1.086 1.130 1.194 1.189 1.260 1.311
12 0.136 0.331 0.576 0.126 0.251 0.370 1.096 1.147 1.213 1.208 1.292 1.355
28 0.144 0.343 0.627 0.142 0.264 0.394 1.077 1.128 1.188 1.207 1.273 1.349
33 0.175 0.356 0.627 0.163 0.268 0.399 1.100 1.151 1.215 1.186 1.249 1.315
36 0.187 0.368 0.605 0.165 0.272 0.383 1.106 1.154 1.212 1.265 1.325 1.391
16 0.131 0.392 0.629 0.118 0.286 0.387 1.052 1.112 1.189 1.232 1.296 1.368
21 0.175 0 398 0.762 0.160 0.309 0.485 1.067 1.112 1.175 1.155 1.207 1.269
19 0.157 0.416 0.773 0.162 0.299 0.452 1.082 1.140 1.229 1.183 1.244 1.327
38 0.202 0.417 0.992 0.214 0.348 0.569 1.066 1.130 1.207 1.140 1.219 1.297
20 0.192 0.462 0.890 0.174 0.325 0.488 1.062 1.107 1.173 1.167 1.226 1.311
17 0.150 0.475 0.842 0.142 0.342 0.462 1.057 1.092 1.135 1.140 1.184 1.258
22 0.194 0.494 1.051 0.181 0.350 0.562 1.070 1.120 1.180 1.160 1.250 1.319
18 0.321 0.686 1.188 0.245 0.408 0.548 1.056 1.092 1.137 1.169 1.215 1.285
Mean 0.102 0.271 0.514 0.111 0.225 0.355 1.094 1.153 1.226 1.214 1.275 1.344
Q1 0.103 0.189 0.342 0.099 0.165 0.257 1.071 1.130 1.196 1.174 1.231 1.311
Q2 0.128 0.269 0.444 0.117 0.218 0.310 1.095 1.153 1.230 1.219 1.276 1.347
Q3 0.151 0.352 0.623 0.142 0.271 0.393 1.110 1.175 1.255 1.265 1.328 1.388
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Table 3
Standard labor economics approach: Industry analysis:
Estimated industry-specic wage-prots elasticity
b"w
N

I
and extent of rent sharing b
I
GMM SYS (t  2)(t  3)
DEP. VAR.: ln
 
wj(i)t

DEP. VAR.: ln (wit) DEP. VAR.: ln
 P
j2i
wj(i)tP
j
j2i
!
Industry I
b"w
N

I
b
I
b
I
b"w
N

I
b
I
b
I
b"w
N

I
b
I
b
I
14 0.013 (0.007) 0.026 0.025 0.102 (0.025) 0.204 0.170 0.079 (0.048) 0.159 0.137
17 0.014 (0.026) 0.035 0.034 -0.029 (0.022) -0.076 -0.082 -0.001 (0.042) -0.002 -0.002
22 0.021 (0.014) 0.054 0.051 0.003 (0.022) 0.007 0.007 -0.106 (0.047) -0.266 -0.362
2 0.062 (0.023) 0.059 0.056 0.086 (0.025) 0.083 0.077 0.128 (0.052) 0.124 0.110
34 0.061 (0.015) 0.078 0.072 0.063 (0.026) 0.081 0.074 0.065 (0.038) 0.084 0.077
21 0.036 (0.022) 0.091 0.084 0.000 (0.028) 0.001 0.001 0.027 (0.039) 0.069 0.065
1 0.065 (0.021) 0.095 0.086 0.087 (0.020) 0.127 0.112 0.086 (0.038) 0.125 0.111
9 0.082 (0.022) 0.097 0.088 0.084 (0.046) 0.099 0.090 0.087 (0.047) 0.103 0.094
13 0.055 (0.033) 0.102 0.093 0.022 (0.031) 0.040 0.039 0.097 (0.060) 0.179 0.152
10 0.075 (0.021) 0.110 0.099 0.097 (0.050) 0.141 0.124 0.087 (0.061) 0.127 0.113
24 0.094 (0.038) 0.112 0.100 0.106 (0.035) 0.160 0.138 0.088 (0.059) 0.105 0.095
3 0.144 (0.018) 0.116 0.104 0.040 (0.045) 0.032 0.031 0.189 (0.065) 0.152 0.132
16 0.046 (0.010) 0.118 0.105 0.034 (0.028) 0.088 0.081 0.080 (0.057) 0.205 0.170
12 0.063 (0.022) 0.137 0.121 0.056 (0.024) 0.121 0.108 -0.014 (0.058) -0.031 -0.032
29 0.090 (0.038) 0.142 0.124 0.144 (0.029) 0.228 0.186 0.087 (0.053) 0.138 0.122
15 0.097 (0.015) 0.146 0.127 0.048 (0.030) 0.072 0.068 0.059 (0.045) 0.089 0.082
4 0.211 (0.044) 0.150 0.130 0.011 (0.027) 0.008 0.008 -0.024 (0.048) -0.017 -0.017
19 0.071 (0.016) 0.159 0.137 0.035 (0.027) 0.077 0.072 0.065 (0.034) 0.145 0.127
30 0.154 (0.021) 0.179 0.152 0.126 (0.023) 0.147 0.128 0.157 (0.041) 0.183 0.155
28 0.078 (0.019) 0.186 0.157 0.093 (0.021) 0.222 0.181 0.023 (0.044) 0.055 0.052
20 0.074 (0.024) 0.200 0.166 0.044 (0.020) 0.117 0.105 -0.007 (0.045) -0.020 -0.020
23 0.147 (0.009) 0.214 0.177 0.015 (0.019) 0.022 0.022 0.053 (0.030) 0.078 0.072
11 0.092 (0.025) 0.220 0.180 0.062 (0.023) 0.149 0.130 0.087 (0.042) 0.209 0.173
8 0.115 (0.023) 0.244 0.196 0.035 (0.026) 0.074 0.069 0.048 (0.051) 0.102 0.092
27 0.117 (0.025) 0.253 0.202 0.081 (0.023) 0.176 0.149 0.034 (0.046) 0.073 0.068
6 0.095 (0.018) 0.254 0.202 0.134 (0.023) 0.357 0.263 0.107 (0.025) 0.284 0.221
37 0.144 (0.023) 0.259 0.206 0.073 (0.025) 0.131 0.116 0.081 (0.047) 0.145 0.127
33 0.135 (0.025) 0.259 0.206 0.033 (0.022) 0.064 0.060 0.077 (0.042) 0.147 0.128
32 0.188 (0.027) 0.274 0.215 0.089 (0.039) 0.130 0.115 0.129 (0.055) 0.187 0.158
35 0.111 (0.024) 0.282 0.220 0.065 (0.032) 0.166 0.142 0.026 (0.048) 0.067 0.063
28 0.184 (0.018) 0.293 0.226 0.092 (0.023) 0.147 0.128 0.047 (0.039) 0.075 0.070
38 0.139 (0.012) 0.293 0.227 0.052 (0.020) 0.110 0.099 0.085 (0.034) 0.179 0.152
36 0.115 (0.031) 0.294 0.227 -0.037 (0.023) -0.095 -0.105 0.079 (0.040) 0.202 0.168
31 0.184 (0.009) 0.299 0.230 0.126 (0.025) 0.204 0.170 0.141 (0.040) 0.230 0.187
26 0.221 (0.018) 0.314 0.239 0.073 (0.017) 0.104 0.094 0.138 (0.029) 0.197 0.164
5 0.209 (0.016) 0.357 0.263 0.135 (0.018) 0.231 0.188 0.099 (0.030) 0.169 0.145
7 0.193 (0.0222) 0.374 0.272 0.102 (0.026) 0.198 0.165 0.109 (0.052) 0.211 0.174
18 0.173 (0.013) 0.641 0.391 -0.022 (0.018) -0.082 -0.090 -0.035 (0.043) -0.128 -0.147
Mean 0.110 (0.021) 0.198 0.158 0.102 (0.026) 0.107 0.090 0.067 (0.045) 0.109 0.089
Q1 0.066 (0.016) 0.110 0.099 0.103 (0.025) 0.066 0.062 0.037 (0.039) 0.073 0.068
Q2 0.096 (0.021) 0.182 0.154 0.102 (0.022) 0.113 0.102 0.080 (0.045) 0.126 0.112
Q3 0.147 (0.025) 0.270 0.213 0.103 (0.028) 0.158 0.136 0.085 (0.051) 0.179 0.152
Time dummies are included but not reported. First-step robust standard errors in parentheses.
Instruments used: the lagged levels of q, n, m and k dated (t  2) and (t  3) in the rst-di¤erenced equations and
the lagged rst-di¤erences of q, n, m and k dated (t  1) in the levels equations.
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Table 4
Productivity approach: Industry analysis:
Estimated industry-specic extent of rent sharing bI and mark-up bI (only)
GMM SYS (t  2)(t  3)
Industry I bI bI bI only bI
1 -1.041 (0.354) 25.55 (213.5) 0.971 (0.067) 0.874 (0.076)
3 -0.688 (0.210) -2.210 (2.162) 1.260 (0.062) 1.079 (0.071)
32 -0.411 (0.310) -0.697 (0.894) 1.129 (0.041) 1.018 (0.078)
10 -0.277 (0.302) -0.384 (0.578) 1.245 (0.039) 1.166 (0.086)
19 -0.269 (0.477) -0.368 (0.892) 1.238 (0.036) 1.173 (0.104)
4 -0.254 (0.227) -0.340 (0.407) 1.274 (0.046) 1.203 (0.072)
17 -0.254 (0.537) -0.340 (0.964) 1.094 (0.031) 1.057 (0.066)
9 -0.234 (0.256) -0.306 (0.436) 1.329 (0.049) 1.253 (0.073)
25 -0.221 (0.355) -0.283 (0.585) 1.076 (0.063) 1.012 (0.110)
14 -0.212 (0.348) -0.268 (0.560) 1.144 (0.032) 1.086 (0.079)
20 -0.062 (0.410) -0.066 (0.466) 1.230 (0.035) 1.215 (0.095)
21 -0.060 (0.452) -0.064 (0.512) 1.199 (0.048) 1.187 (0.095)
29 -0.034 (0.160) -0.035 (0.172) 1.239 (0.029) 1.229 (0.056)
34 0.007 (0.207) 0.007 (0.204) 1.261 (0.051) 1.257 (0.082)
2 0.011 (0.242) 0.010 (0.273) 1.125 (0.049) 1.122 (0.059)
38 0.030 (0.269) 0.029 (0.254) 1.088 (0.033) 1.090 (0.067)
15 0.096 (0.245) 0.088 (0.204) 1.242 (0.037) 1.263 (0.067)
30 0.179 (0.102) 0.151 (0.073) 1.260 (0.033) 1.364 (0.067)
23 0.212 (0.373) 0.175 (0.254) 1.204 (0.050) 1.244 (0.106)
13 0.240 (0.216) 0.193 (0.140) 1.263 (0.063) 1.328 (0.106)
33 0.247 (0.243) 0.198 (0157) 1.147 (0.024) 1.202 (0.054)
28 0.248 (0.307) 0.199 (0.197) 1.226 (0.035) 1.261 (0.081)
31 0.279 (0.218) 0.218 (0.133) 1.131 (0.036) 1.222 (0.083)
24 0.328 (0.158) 0.247 (0.089) 1.159 (0.033) 1.263 (0.065)
11 0.397 (0.287) 0.284 (0.147) 1.264 (0.037) 1.334 (0.075)
7 0.416 (0.291) 0.294 (0.145) 1.181 (0.058) 1.258 (0.099)
26 0.456 (0.145) 0.313 (0.068) 1.232 (0.050) 1.420 (0.075)
36 0.464 (0.152) 0.317 (0.071) 1.134 (0.018) 1.252 (0.043)
35 0.487 (0.159) 0.327 (0.072) 1.227 (0.031) 1.365 (0.052)
5 0.504 (0.097) 0.335 (0.043) 1.126 (0.033) 1.269 (0.048)
37 0.621 (0.140) 0.383 (0.053) 1.250 (0.029) 1.525 (0.076)
12 0.637 (0.175) 0.389 (0.065) 1.275 (0.035) 1.486 (0.068)
16 0.680 (0.216) 0.405 (0.076) 1.210 (0.042) 1.362 (0.065)
27 0.696 (0.272) 0.410 (0.094) 1.166 (0.027) 1.329 (0.080)
18 0.763 (0.291) 0.433 (0.094) 1.106 (0.020) 1.220 (0.048)
8 0.766 (0.132) 0.434 (0.042) 1.241 (0.020) 1.461 (0.050)
5 0.880 (0.170) 0.468 (0.048) 1.183 (0.039) 1.318 (0.049)
22 1.025 (0.291) 0.506 (0.071) 1.089 (0.032) 1.271 (0.068)
Mean 0.175 (0.258) 0.711 (5.926) 1.190 (0.039) 1.238 (0.074)
Q1 -0.174 (0.172) -0.066 (0.074) 1.132 (0.032) 1.176 (0.065)
Q2 0.226 (0.244) 0.196 (0.164) 1.207 (0.036) 1.252 (0.073)
Q3 0.481 (0.306) 0.333 (0.459) 1.244 (0.049) 1.326 (0.082)
Time dummies are included but not reported. First-step robust standard errors in parentheses.
Instruments used: the lagged levels of q, n, m and k dated (t  2) and (t  3) in the rst-di¤erenced equations and
the lagged rst-di¤erences of q, n, m and k dated (t  1) in the levels equations.
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Table 5
Comparison of the distribution of the extent of rent sharing 
I
across the three approaches
GMM SYS (t  2)(t  3)
# Ind. Estimate Mean Q1 Q2 Q3
38 Accounting aI 0.225 0.162 0.218 0.272
38 Worker wage bI 0.158 0.099 0.154 0.215
38 Firm wage 1 bI 0.090 0.060 0.102 0.138
38 Firm wage 2 bI 0.089 0.068 0.112 0.152
38 Productivity bI 0.710 -0.066 0.196 0.335
20 Accounting aI 0.209 0.160 0.213 0.246
20 Worker wage bI 0.175 0.116 0.199 0.223
20 Firm wage 1 bI 0.221 0.076 0.122 0.157
20 Firm wage 2 bI 0.129 0.087 0.136 0.167
20 Productivity bI 0.249 0.172 0.265 0.359
OLS LEV
38 Accounting aI 0.225 0.162 0.218 0.272
38 Worker wage bI 0.127 0.089 0.121 0.162
38 Firm wage 1 bI 0.140 0.113 0.137 0.166
38 Firm wage 2 bI 0.106 0.072 0.112 0.143
38 Productivity bI 0.064 -0.115 0.091 0.200
20 Accounting aI 0.237 0.190 0.219 0.260
20 Worker wage bI 0.151 0.118 0.142 0.189
20 Firm wage 1 bI 0.161 0.129 0.156 0.178
20 Firm wage 2 bI 0.129 0.102 0.126 0.154
20 Productivity bI 0.180 0.108 0.151 0.257
Workerrefers to estimating the wage equation of the standard labor economics approach using
ln(wj(i)t) as the dependent variable, Firm wage 1refers to the case where ln(wit) is the dependent variable
and Firm wage 2refers to the case where ln
 P
j2i
wj(i)tP
j
j2i
!
is the dependent variable.
27
                                                                           
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0 
 
0.1 
 
0.2 
 
0.3 
 
0.4 
 
 0.5 
 
Source:  Own estimates [20 industries]  
 
Accounting aI 
 
Firm wage 1 I 
 Worker wage I 
 
Firm wage 2 I 
 Productivity I 
 
0 
 
0.1 
 
0.2 
 
0.3 
 
 0.4 
 
Source:  Own estimates [20 industries] 
 
Accounting aI 
 
Firm wage 1 I 
Worker wage I 
 
Firm wage 2 I 
 Productivity I 
 
Figure 1a: System GMM estimates of rent sharing across the three approaches 
Figure 1b: Levels OLS estimates of rent sharing across the three approaches 
 
Appendix: Statistical Annex
Table A.1
Industry repartition
Industry I Code Name # Firms # Workers
# Obs.
Firm
dataset
# Obs.
Matched
worker-rm
dataset
1 B01 Meat preparations 276 2006 3913 13514
2 B02 Milk products 109 1716 1603 13269
3 B03 Beverages 96 1297 1390 10118
4 B04 Food production for animals 105 721 1516 5479
5 B05-B06 Other food products 427 3492 6153 26601
6 C11 Clothing and skin goods 388 2407 5333 17234
7 C12 Leather goods and footwear 186 1328 2680 10471
8 C20 Publishing, (re)printing 618 3427 8834 25286
9 C31 Pharmaceutical products 125 2738 1779 20113
10 C32 Soap, perfume and maintenance products 102 1699 1518 13583
11 C41 Furniture 286 2001 4189 16353
12 C42, C44-C46 Accommodation equipment 163 1892 2370 15976
13 C43 Sport articles, games and other products 138 913 1942 6938
14 D01 Motor vehicles 117 9342 1725 77448
15 D02 Transport equipment 122 2788 1848 21494
16 E11-E14 Ship building, aircraft and railway construction 100 3793 1492 26316
17 E21 Metal products for construction 136 669 1956 4679
18 E22 Ferruginous and steam boilers 247 1610 3609 11364
19 E23 Mechanical equipment 159 2027 2412 16898
20 E24 Machinery for general usage 234 1942 3367 15490
21 E25-E26 Agriculture machinery 133 752 1910 5696
22 E27-E28 Other machinery for specic usage 237 1598 3425 12955
23 E31-E35 Electric and electronic machinery 160 2381 2289 15450
24 F11-F12 Mineral products 159 641 2332 4763
25 F13 Glass products 93 1916 1382 17855
26 F14 Earthenware products and construction material 334 2824 4878 21471
27 F21 Textile art 235 1940 3322 13583
28 F22-F23 Textile products and clothing 277 2227 3943 16788
29 F31 Wooden products 360 1317 5267 10579
30 F32-F33 Paper and printing products 288 2692 4247 22810
31 F41-F42 Mineral and organic chemical products 180 5338 2718 52625
32 F43-F45 Parachemical and rubber products 149 1780 2216 13824
33 F46 Transformation of plastic products 521 3233 7710 25874
34 F51-F52 Steel products, non-ferrous metals 116 2746 1704 22452
35 F53 Ironware 126 1120 1887 9277
36 F54 ustrial service to metal products 812 2925 11880 22946
37 F55-F56 Metal products, recuperation 518 3277 7563 25843
38 F61-F62 Electrical goods and components 289 4838 4250 36278
29
